Showing posts with label linda chung kar yan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label linda chung kar yan. Show all posts

GLCs Under Fire? (A Most Important Posting)

Savvy market watchers would have noticed a quite deliberate sell down in GLCs and related counters. Yes, markets are depressed, yes... foreign funds are doing another selling wave. But isn't it a bit out of the ordinary to see GLCs being sold down persistently?


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The ones being hammered: Sime Darby (understandably), but others are getting whacked as well, Petronas Chemical, Axiata, MRCB, UEM Land, CIMB, AirAsia (new link up now can be considered as related GLC counter), ... even Kencana, IJM, SP Setia ...


Coffee shop talk would have you believe that it could be an aggregation of various factors:


1) Unpalatable corporate governance issues


2) Cashing up owing to upcoming elections


3) Downgrades in property and oil and gas sectors


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Foreign funds vote with their shares. Recent corporate governance issues have been very unpalatable. Some even say that certain parties are trying to push through certain deals prior to the elections, at all costs. Besides the Sime Darby-E&O deal, the AirAsia-MAS deal was a sour note ... not many mainstream media or analysts dared to mention that CIMB was advising both parties??!! What kind of crap is that? Its like a court case where the prosecutor and defending lawyer are from the same firm. Please show me ONE other case in global corporate M&A transactions whereby one investment bank advises both sides.


You'd think there would be more support from local funds, in fact PNB and EPF have been having to up their stakes in indexed stocks over the last 3 years owing to lessening participation of other investing groups (private and foreign investors alike). Take any of the top 20 indexed stocks and mark out how much Khazanah, EPF and PNB collectively hold.


That IS NOT A GOOD THING!!! A vibrant, liquid and transparent exchange is needed for it to fulfil a proper capital markets' objectives. It has now come to a stage whereby local funds control the index ... the flip side is local funds are buying because NOBODY else wants to buy.


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Indonesia used to be way behind us in terms of stock market attractiveness, market capitalisation, liquidity, transparency issues .... Now Indonesia has overtaken us on ALL counts, yes, their total market capitalisation is bigger than ours now.


The stranger thing is that the Indonesian market have a very very low participation rate by their local funds. They do not have their PNBs or EPFs ... this is all the more glaring when you line up our markets. 


15 years ago it would have been HK, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Sri Lanka... in that order of attractiveness to investors
5 years ago it would have been HK, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Sri Lanka
Now, its HK, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Sri Lanka ...
I believe 3-5 years from now, if left unchecked ... it would be HK, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Malaysia 


We all know the reasons why, I can highlight all those reasons, even those on both sides of the fence know why .... well... do we know where we are headed if we continue this way? If you do, are you doing anything about it?

Press Metal Is A Multi Bagger In The Making

The market is holding now, which gives all an opportunity to take money off the table or revise their bets. I have been following Press Metal since its dramatic run up back in December when it shot up from below RM2.00 to hit a high of RM2.80. Thus, it has given me ample time to assess the company. The timing is just about right as well, with the signing of the PPA and the fund raising exercise proposals last week. I am pretty confident that Press Metal could be the best performing stock this year (of course minus all the brilliant penny stocks below 20 sen la).

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Despite the terrible month of March when all hell broke loose, the stock has been collected assiduously by those who have done their homework since then with few sellers. This led me to conclude that its time to get in now, for a trade or better still to hold till more research and institutions discover the stock.

Safe to say, Press Metal 2 years ago was not the animal it is now. We get the biggest gains in a stock when there is a transformational change to their earnings platform, without sacrificing the the strong underlying business model they have built up. To appreciate where Press Metal is going, its good to look at things chronologically.

What is a potential multi bagger? A multi bagger is something you bought and saw returns in the multiples of 100% ... 100% is a one bagger, 200% is a two bagger and so on. These type of stocks do not come around very much. Imagine if you invested in Cypark at RM1.00 or SP Setia-WB at RM0.50, thats what I am talking about.

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Background: Press Metal was principally engaged in manufacturing and marketing of aluminium products, whilst the principal activities of the subsidiaries are manufacturing and fabrication of aluminium and stainless steel products, property development, recycling of waste, and investment holding. PMETAL is one of the largest aluminium extruders in Malaysia. The company has been awarded with the MS ISO 9002 certification and the ISO 14001 Environmental Management System Certification. In addition, it has also been awarded the Occupational, Health and Safety Management System (OHSAS 18001) from TUV Anlagentechnik Gmbh of Germany. The company''s operation facilities are located at Jalan Kapar, in Klang. Its facilities have the capacities to produce approximately 25,000m/t of extrusions per annum. Meanwhile, PMETAL''s billet casting division has a production capacity of approximately 70,000m/t per annum. The company distributes approximately 45% of its products to overseas markets, such as Singapore and Australia.

Press Metal has long established its position as a leading light within the ASEAN aluminium industry. In Malaysia, it is the largest aluminium extrusion producer, with a capacity of 50,000 tonnes. P Metal has also been an integrated aluminium producer, having flexed its wings in China by acquiring an upstream manufacturing plant some three years ago, in addition to the commencement of its own Chinese extrusion plant two years earlier. The smelter – located in Fushan (Guangdong province) – has an estimated capacity of 90,000 tonnes – and is used to support its downstream extrusion plant. One of the plant’s key advantages is self-sufficiency in the supply of power through its own 180MW-coal fired power plant located next to the smelter. Because of this, Press Metal is able to secure power at a 15% discount to Chinese grid prices.

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2007 - Nascent start into the upstream segment of the aluminium industry supply chain (~ three years). Press Metal took over the reins of an existing China smelter in 2007, and only commenced its own smelter in Sarawak last November 2010.

November 2009 - Having rolled out its maiden production in November 2009 (Phase 1A: 60,000 tonnes), Press Metal has put out an early marker over its rivals. The three other similar but larger proposals - i.e. Salco (Rio Tinto-CMS JV), Smelter Asia (GIIG-CHALCO JV) and 1MDB-SGCC JV – are still at the planning/negotiation stage, with no visible signs of them taking off anytime soon. Capacity at is Mukah smelter is poised to double to 120,000 tonnes with the commissioning of Phase 1B by end-4Q10.

Mid-2010 - The group’s value proposition is further enhanced by the recent emergence of Japan’s Sumitomo as a cornerstone investor in its Mukah plant (20% stake plus option for another 5%) – including Phase 2 of its proposed plant expansion worth around US$600mil. The emergence of Sumitomo is critical as its massive trading and distribution arm will extend Press Metal's presence in export markets. Apart from secured off-take, the deal offers a solid platform for P Metal to leverage on Sumitomo’s extensive network and broaden its market share. Sumitomo – Japan’s third largest trading company – is no stranger to the aluminium business. The group already has investments in aluminium smelters in Australia, Brazil and Indonesia. It also trades primary aluminium in Japan and other Asian markets.

October 2010 - P Metal is on the cusp of a structural transformation into an integrated aluminium giant within ASEAN, following the successful rollout of its smelter in Mukah, Sarawak. Press Metal has a roadmap to be a pure integrated aluminum player. Mukah plant will crucially have unencumbered access to cheap hydro power and the firstmover advantage as the country’s first smelter. Press Metal’s Mukah smelter is one of only two operating within ASEAN – which together with China – has a base consumption of 20 million tonnes (or circa half of global aluminium demand). Press Metal is in a strong position to secure an additional power of 510MW from Sarawak Energy Bhd at attractive rates against the spectre of an insufficient off-take in the state when Bakun comes on stream by end-1H11.

November 2010 - Phase 1B of the Mukah plant was commissioned – doubling its capacity to ~120,000 tonnes.

April 12, 2011 - Press Metal and three other foreign companies have signed separate power purchase agreement (PPA) term sheets with Sarawak Energy Bhd. Apart from Press Metal, the other three companies are Japan’s Tokuyama Corp, Singapore listed OM Materials and Asia Minerals Ltd. Sarawak Energy Chief Executive Officer Torstein Dale Sjotveit was quoted as saying that the four companies would require long-term supply of 1,300MW of power to their plants. Part of the electricity would be supplied via the 2,400MW Bakun Hydroelectricity dam – which is expected to commence production of its first 300MW in three months’ time. The latest development marks another significant step towards the crystallisation of a tariff structure for power off-take for Phase 2 of Press Metal’s US$600mil expansion plans.

April 15, 2011 - Press Metal announced that it has received approval from the Sarawak state planning authority to construct a new 240,000 tonne p.a. smelter in Samalaju Industrial Park, Bintulu. The land is to be developed over a period of five years – and could potentially triple Press Metal’s existing capacity to 360,000 tonnes.

April 18, 2011 - This is highly significant, as soon as they secured the PPA, Press Metal announced the following proposals:
(i) Renounceable rights issue of up to RM324mil nominal value Redeemable Convertible Secured Loan Stocks (RCSLS)
(ii) Up to 147mil free detachable warrants.
The basis for conversion is (1) RM2.20 nominal value RCSLS and (1) one warrant for every three (3) existing P Metal ordinary shares. The conversion price of the RCSLS has been fixed at RM2.20 – with a maturity period of 8 years. The latest proposal appears to be a strategic move by Press Metal to raise capital ahead of the targeted roll-out of Phase 2 of its expansion programme estimated to cost ~US$600mil (RM1.8bil). Alpha Milestone Sdn Bhd – a vehicle owned by the Koon family (major shareholders of P Metal) – has given their irrevocable undertaking to subscribe for the RCSLS/warrants not taken up by other shareholders. This is also highly significant.

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Risk Factor #1 - Delays in negotiations for the PPA. Any delays in ongoing negotiations between Press Metal and SEB on the supply of power from Bakun could be a potential drag factor. That factor have been drastically nullified by the signing of PPA last week, a fact which was seemingly lost on investors.

Risk Factor #2 - Balance sheet concerns At face value, Press Metal’s current balance sheet appears to be a little stretched at 169% as at 30 June 2010. This is mainly due to the hefty US$300mil spent on Phase 1 under its Mukah smelter. Its looked like the funding requirements were based on a debt/equity ratio of 60:40. However, its net gearing level to improve to 121% and 97% respectively by FY11F-FY12F – as deleveraging would come along with rising cash flows from its Mukah smelter. The full-commissioning of Phase 1 – where the US$300mil capex has already been spent upfront – is expected to kick in from FY11F onwards.Furthermore, we do not discount the possibility of Sumitomo coming in as a co-investor for Phase 2 of the new smelter worth an estimated US$600mil.

The RCSLS / free warrant proposals last week should put to rest the burden of fund raising for them to start Phase 2. Its an attractive scheme and I think the controlling shareholders would be mopping up shares in the coming days and weeks ahead of the ex-date. Hence I expect a smooth trajectory upwards to RM3.20 up to the ex-date for the share price.

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Earnings Visibility - With capex for the entire Phase 1 (US$300mil) already frontloaded, we can expect sequential earnings momentum to gain traction along with rapid expansion in margins. Total capacity should double to 120,000 tonnes in FY11 with the commissioning of Phase 1B by year-end. Earnings are at an inflexion point – with a robust FY10F-12F EPS CAGR of 64%. Core earnings surged six-fold to RM30mil just from a six-month contribution from Phase 1A. Earnings are at an inflexion point – with a robust FY10F-12F EPS CAGR of 64%. In 1HFY0, core earnings surged six-fold to RM30mil just from a six-month contribution from Phase 1A of the Mukah smelter.

Preferential Business Model - A key advantage of the Mukah smelter is its unencumbered access to cheap hydro power under the Sarawak Corridor for Renewable Energy (SCORE) – Sarawak’s economic growth corridor. Supply of power typically accounts for one-third of an aluminium smelter’s cost structure. Press Metal had in January 2009 signed a technical agreement with SEB for the supply of over 600MW of power over a 25-year period. For Phase 1 (180MW), Press Metal has managed to secure power from SEB at fairly attractive rates (~half of the cost of Chinese smelters). While the actual tariffs were not disclosed, earlier press reports indicated that the aluminium smelters were requesting for power rates of 13.6 sen/kHW (~US$4 cents/khW). The additional power would likely come from the Bakun hydroelectric dam.

Regional Player - What many investor might not know is how Press Metal’s rapid progression as an integrated aluminium giant within ASEAN will translate to its visibility for institutional investors. ASEAN together with China – has a base consumption of 20 million tonnes (or ~half of global aluminium demand). In Malaysia alone, aluminium consumption is circa 250,000 tonnes compared with Press Metal’s current capacity of 120,000 tonnes (360,000 tonnes assuming Phase 2 takes off). There is currently a void of aluminium smelters within ASEAN – where Press Metal is one of only two players.

Industry Outlook - Japanese trading giant Marubeni recently projected the global aluminium imbalance (global surplus) to fall by 23% to 1.3 million tonnes in 2011 from an estimated 1.7 million tonnes in 2010. Alcoa – America’s largest aluminium maker – was even more aggressive. It has revised 2010 global surplus estimates to ~1 million tonnes or an 18% decline from its previous estimates in 2Q10.

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Valuation - Valuations are exceedingly compelling – at FY10F-12F PEs of only 6x-14x against EPS CAGR of 64%). This represents a deep 40% discount to its larger integrated global commodity and pure aluminium peers. It is also trading at a Price/Book ratio of only 1.1x or a 30% discount against its peers. Press Metal deserves to trade at a scarcity premium - given its deepening progression as an integrated regional aluminium player with an additional capacity kicker coming from its Mukah smelter. More importantly, Press Metal is deeply under-appreciated and under-covered with just ONE research house coverage currently.

What You Didn't Know About Press Metal (look at your iPad or when you shop at IKEA) - Traditionally, the four main user-groups for Press Metal’s aluminium products can be broken down into:
(i) Rolling-mill sheet producers,
(ii) Cable producers;
(iii) Alloy wheel producers; and
(iv) Extrusion manufacturers.
To stay ahead of competition, P Metal has strived to add value to its conventional approach of supplying commodity-based extruded aluminium by offering custommade solutions. This includes the packaging and installation of aluminium products for end-clients. As a result, Press Metal has successfully established itself as one of only two suppliers of aluminium products for IKEA in China. It is also a supplier to the contract manufacturer for Apple’s I Pad (accounting for 20% of P Metal’s volume under a three-year contract).

Planning and Execution Are In The Details - Press Metal’s move upstream is not something new - given its investments in China. You might like to know that Aluminium Corp of China Ltd (CHALCO) – China’s leading aluminium producer - was roped in as the technical partner and turnkey contractor for the Mukah smelter, thereby truncating any start-up risk. The group has since redeployed over 100 staff from its Chinese plant to kickstart its plant in Mukah.

Results - For 2009 the company recorded revenue of RM1.18bn and net profits of RM26.7m, EPS 7.3 sen. As the Mukah operations started to kick in towards the last quarter of 2010, 2010 saw its revenue jumping to RM1.713bn and net profit scaling to RM81.4m, EPS was 18.9 sen. For 2011, revenue is slated to move up to RM2.1bn and net profit should hit RM128m, an EPS of 30 sen. The RM2.1bn figure ONLY takes into account the gradual contributions from Phase 1. Hence we are not needing to look very far out into the horizon to get comfort. Even IF THEY STOP EVERYTHING for Phase 2 now, the stock is very cheap.

Significant Covenants - I like this a lot. If you peruse their Annual Report, you will find that the company has "covenants with their borrowing policy". In connection with the significant term loan facilities of a subsidiary, Press Metal Sarawak Sdn. Bhd., the subsidiary and the Group have agreed on the following significant covenants with the lenders:
i) Project Debt-to-Equity ratio of the subsidiary to be maintained below the ratio of 70:30 at all times; equity is defined to include all subordinated debts and shareholders advances;
ii) Minimum Finance Service Cover Ratio (“FSCR”) of 1.25 times, where FSCR equal to the subsidiary’s net operating cash flows for the year plus opening cash balance divided by total facility payment due for the current year;
iii) no material change in the business plan of the subsidiary and Press Metal Berhad Group; and
iv) the Company shall maintain its shareholdings in the subsidiary more than or equivalent to 80% throughout the tenure of the facility.
I don't know about you, but these covenants speak volume about their committment for the long haul to create great value for the company over the medium to longer term.

So, this is no longer an airy-fairy concept stock. It has successfully rolled out Phase 1 and making good money at it. They now are quietly raising funds for the second phase and that can only enlarge the successful platform they have. They are not the types that have suddenly bought a mine (when they do not know anything about mining logistics and distribution) or they are waiting to sign a big contract from the government or they are waiting for a casino license in East Malaysia. Press Metal is a direct play on the debasement (gradual devaluation) of the US dollar and its associated reflationary pressure on base metal prices. Things are already in place and have been jump started, and profits are flowing.

The two biggest hurdles, balance sheet strains and PPA, have just been swiftly addressed. They are not going into something new, they have already proven that they can deliver Phase 1 well. Multi bagger stocks will go through a period of "sure or not, sure can or not". Many have lofty projections and hearsay ambitions. Press Metal has been relatively quiet, while steadfastly delivering. They are also not your fly by nights who suddenly got something out of the blue and promises so much. Press Metal just went upstream in a gradual big way. Knocking off target KPIs one by one with aplomb and the assuredness of a seasoned business group, how not to ride along. Its not fair to put a target price, as just the Phase 1 alone should see it solidly valued at RM3.40. If they replicate Phase 2, we are looking at RM6.00 in 12-18 months. I would recommend to buy and subscribe to the proposals for full value on the upside.

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NOTE: The above opinion is not an invitation to buy or sell. It serves as a blogging activity of my investing thoughts and ideas, this does not represent an investment advisory service as I charge no subscription or management fees (donations are welcomed though). I may have a position in the counter already. The content on this site is provided as general information only and should not be taken as investment advice. All site content, shall not be construed as a recommendation to buy or sell any security or financial instrument. The ideas expressed are solely the opinions of the author. Any action that you take as a result of information, analysis, or commentary on this site is ultimately your responsibility. Consult your investment adviser before making any investment decisions.

Difficult To Account For Chinese Companies' Profits



I would have to qualify the heading as listed Chinese companies would be following generally accepted accounting principle. The issue of difficulty rests mainly when you try to value unlisted businesses, as many companies try their best to minimise taxes paid. Mark Dixon wrote an excellent piece on what things to look for in trying to come up with real profits, and the hazards of being a private equity player in China.

Mark Dixon, a founder of the mergers and acquisitions adviser the1.com, which is active in mainland China, unwittingly unearthed some Chinese accounting tricks while valuing a local company.

What with the world still reeling from the domino effect that Lehman Brothers’ balance sheet had on financial markets, the exposure of accounting frauds like the one at the Madoff fund and the final throes of the expenses scandal in the British Parliament, a trip to China promised to be a breath of fresh air in this atmosphere of fishy finances.

Hired by a client to help with an acquisition in China, I was given the job of deciding how much the buyer should pay for the business. That meant first calculating an accurate profit for the target company, its so-called normalized profit.

In the West, the process involves making a few small adjustments caused by things like no longer having to pay salaries to sellers if they aren’t going to stay at the company and other nonrecurring items. But it shouldn’t mean having to recalculate the entire income statement.

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles are not generally accepted in China. This is partly because the Chinese have their own accounting rules and partly because rules are for breaking. And it’s not just that some company owners are trying to confuse the tax authorities. It’s that, when they do so, they end up also confusing themselves. The gymnastics they do with revenues and costs are so impressive that the Beijing Olympics should have added an event especially for accountants. Markets with developed gray economies, like Italy, are well known for the practice of keeping one set of accounts for the government and another for the owners so they know what’s really going on. Chinese companies often dispense with the second set, hence the confusion. That’s probably true of other “developing gray economies.”

One can hardly call something normal when it doesn’t normally happen. So my quest for normalized profit was really a search for the abnormal — indeed, it might better be called abnormal profit. In fact, it was so elusive it seemed like a search for the abominable snowman.

My Chinese interpreter couldn’t handle the term normalized profit, so I dropped it in favor of true profit. But that only caused offense because it implied the figure before adjustment was a lie, which indeed it was. I then tried the expression official profit, by which I meant “what it officially should be,” but that didn’t work because it got lost in translation with the false profit they were officially reporting. I finally explained it as “the profit you would have received if you had reported everything completely correctly,” at which point I added, “Let’s for simplicity just call it Profit X!”

Now everyone understood what I wanted. But they couldn’t understand why I wanted it. “We’d only pay more taxes,” they explained. The mathematical difficulties of calculating Profit X are compounded by the delicacy of the subject. It’s not only a confidentiality issue — after all, I might be a government spy — but it’s also simply embarrassing to admit what they’ve been up to. Someone who behaves like a traditional, polite accountant will never find out the truth. One needs to use both carrot and stick. The stick is “Your business looks surprisingly unprofitable.” This provokes the Chinese pride, which, once awoken, quickly displaces any embarrassment. It also triggers natural commercial instinct — they instinctively realize the intentionally low profit figure is somehow going to hurt them in the upcoming negotiation. The carrot is “Don’t worry, I’ve seen this many times before.” Said with the bedside manner of a family doctor, it allows the final key to be turned. The scene is now set for a tour of their forbidden city.

At this point, we were ready to dive into the “abnormalization” process itself. Every stone I turned over seemed to reveal not a single spider but countless additional stones, each of which needed to be investigated. While pursuing each line of questioning, I found myself having to note side questions to ask later — my memory isn’t that good. At the most frustrating point I was told, “You can’t expect to understand China — our accounting is different.”

They weren’t trying to derail me from my quest. (Indeed, companies are fairly cooperative once they have bought into the process.) It was rather a way of trying to calm me down — but it only revved me up the more. It seemed as if the project would never end (I was already down to the last clean shirt), but eventually I had exhausted all of my questions: the Profit X figure was there in black and white.

I have invented a formula to get to the truth faster. Of course, it doesn’t help you get your hands on the figures to input, but it does show which ones you’ll need to get and what to do with them. Even if you never need to use it yourself, you may be interested in what it reveals:

Profit X, or normalized after-tax profit =

The amount of after-tax profit actually reported to the government

+ Revenues received off the books to avoid paying revenue tax and to reduce corporation tax

+ Revenues from invoices pushed into the next period in order to delay paying revenue tax in the current period

- Revenues from invoices delayed from the prior period into the current period for the same reason

- Revenue tax the business should have paid on the net effect of these three adjustments

- Employee salaries paid off the books

- A “gross-up” to bring this off-the-books employee cost to a level at which the employees themselves would have received the same amount after tax if they had been paid legally (otherwise, they’ll go and work off the books somewhere else!)

- The extra Social Security cost the business should have paid on these two amounts

- Real expenses the business couldn’t deduct because the supplier couldn’t provide official government receipts, or fapiao, showing the supplier had paid revenue tax

- A gross-up to bring this to a level at which the supplier would have received the same amount if it had declared the income and paid both revenue and company profit taxes

+ The amount of expenses the business declared for fapiao that had nothing to do with its operations but which somehow found its way into the accounts

- The amount of additional corporation tax on the incremental profit resulting from the net effect of the above 10 items

To be fair, some companies need all the adjustments, and others perhaps none. Only in China does a government have the power and desire to control centrally every invoice that a business issues. For an invoice to be tax-deductible, it must be printed on a government-authorized, numbered receipt called fapiao. The government charges service businesses 5 percent of the face value. The payment it receives is thereby an automatically collected revenue tax, also called business tax, levied on the business issuing the receipt rather than on its recipient.

When profitable businesses pay one another, they are economically encouraged to follow this system because the paying entity can’t deduct the expense without receiving the fapiao. Consumers, of course, have little need to show expenses when they go shopping, so they wouldn’t naturally request fapiao, letting retailers off the hook for sales tax collection. (Sales tax, which retailers must charge and remit to the government, is 13 to 17 percent of sales.)

To deal with this motivational loophole, the government, with free-market thinking, has cleverly persuaded consumers to request receipts from businesses — all retail fapiao are printed with scratch-off lottery numbers on forms issued by the government.

The government is thereby marshaling 1.3 billion Chinese as volunteer tax police by harnessing the Chinese people’s well-known love for gambling. I am counting the children among this volunteer tax police figure because they especially love to check the receipts for prizes.

Such ingenious measures don’t stop some Chinese businesses from cooking the books, but they make a dent in the problem. Indeed, one can hardly imagine the state of Chinese accounting in the absence of this totalitarian control of invoicing.

Back to the M.&A. negotiation. It had been a two-day herculean task to get to the truth. On top of the mathematical work itself, I had been through a cultural minefield before we came out the other side in triumph together. The Chinese owners were as satisfied as I was to arrive at this magic number. In fact, they had never known their “true profit” until that moment.

Now, we were ready for the hard part: the price of the business. The chairman was eager to know how I would value his company. Having understood the figures, I was ready with the answer. “We can give you a 10 P/E,” I said. “In other words, 10 times Profit X.”

The mood over the past few days had been everything but calm, but now an eerie silence descended on the room. “That isn’t even close,” he replied. Indeed, it turned out he wanted 10 times his — not my — real profit: the actual cash they got from the business tax-free, or what could politely be called the pragmatic profit. The problem was that pragmatic profit multiplied by 10 came to almost 20 times Profit X. It wasn’t even worth negotiating.

“What was the point of the last two days if you are now going to use a totally different profit number?” I demanded. He needed no time to find his thoughts. “You missed the point. We did that calculation at your request,” he said. “It’s a completely irrelevant number for us. Why would we give up our company for a lower value just because you want to make it legal?”

With reports of fishy finances still blowing in from the West, it wasn’t the right moment to respond with a speech about morality. At times like this, one wishes instead for an Easterly wind.



p/s photos: Linda Chung Kar Yan

Lim's Family Sells Stake In Genting Singapore


Genting and Resorts had a nice run for the past two weeks. I did not highlight both companies as buys because I am not convinced that the gaming industry restructuring and pain is over by a mile. But if they want to go up, let them. I do not have a strong case against them except that the Sentosa project cost overruns needs to be detailed out to investors. I did not like the left hand right hand transaction between Lim Kok Thay's private company to the listed vehicle a few months back.

I like the fact that Genting and Resorts are much better off than most of the other gaming giants who have over leveraged substantially. I like the fact that most operators in Macau are bleeding and that Genting/Resorts should be able to profit by moving in as a white knight to secure a foothold in Macau.

The sale, through the family’s vehicles Golden Hope Ltd and Lakewood Sdn Bhd, was aimed at boosting the liquidity of the stock, according to the bookrunners .... eeerrr... Genting Singapore is already very liquid thank you very much, next reason please!!! That's like tricking the ghost to eat taufoo!!! Hmmm... who is the ghost here??

I don't like it when the Lim family's private vehicles start to sell down shares in Genting Singapore. Suffice to say that they think Genting Berhad's 55% stake in Genting Singapore is deemed sufficient, or so they say. As in anything, remember Gamuda's Lin selling his stake substantially, supposedly to facilitate estate planning for his family... well we know what happened to Gamuda after that. Its never a good sign. Chances are that Genting Singapore will have to pile on more borrowings, from Resorts or Genting Berhad as I really think the cost overruns issue has not ended. If it has, please come forward with absolute transparency, how much was budgeted before the project started, what is the variance now, how will that impact the payback period, when can Genting Singapore start paying back dividends? Its looking to be a very very long investment.

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Finance Asia: Two investment companies controlled by Malaysia's Lim family were in the market last night attempting to divest their direct 9% stake in Genting Singapore, a Singapore-listed subsidiary of the Genting Berhad group. Genting Singapore is involved in international casino operations and the development of integrated resorts, including a new casino resort on Singapore's Sentosa Island, which is due to open in the first quarter of next year.

The 853.88 million shares were offered in a range between S$0.72 and S$0.76 and late last night the indication was that the price would be fixed at the bottom for a total deal size of S$614.8 million ($425 million). However, the deal wasn't launched until 8.30pm Hong Kong time yesterday and, at the request of a number of Asian investors, sources said the bookrunners had agreed to open the books for a short while before the start of trading this morning to give those who were unable to make an investment decision last night a second chance.

As a result, the terms will not be fixed until this morning. However, the deal was already covered last night and the books included close to 40 accounts. The buyers ranged from specialist gaming investors to long-only Asia funds to deal players who liked the big discount.

The price range corresponded to a discount range of 12.1% to 16.8% versus yesterday's close, which at first glance looks well wide of where most other recent Asian placements have priced. However, the share price has rallied 18.5% over the past three trading sessions, which means investors may have needed the additional incentive to invest at current levels.

There is a lot of positive momentum surrounding the company at the moment however and the share price has more than doubled from the beginning of March when it matched its 2009 low of S$0.415. The company has caught the attention of investors as, contrary to other casino and resorts developers, it is seemingly having no problems to stick to its completion target.

This was confirmed two weeks ago in connection with Genting Singapore's first quarter earnings release, when the management said that it will deliver the Sentosa resort on time and on budget. It also stressed that there is no need to raise more money for this project. This is in sharp contrast to some of its larger rivals like Sands and MGM, which are already laden with debt and have been forced to delay projects because of difficulty in securing the necessary funding. In fact, market talk has it that MGM is looking to sell its 50% stake in MGM Grand Macau and Genting may be a potential buyer.

Aside from Singapore, Genting currently has casino and leisure operations in Australia, the Americas, Malaysia, the Philippines and the UK, but nothing yet in Macau.

Sources say the fact that the Lim family is selling its entire direct stake in Genting Singapore, which it holds through investment companies Golden Hope and Lakewood, isn't a reflection of its views on the company. But with the share price having gone up so much in such a short time, it makes sense for them to monetise part of their holdings. It will also streamline the family's holding in the casino business through one vehicle. The family will still control 55% of Genting Singapore through Malaysia-listed conglomerate Genting Berhad.

J.P. Morgan and UBS acted as joint bookrunners and underwriters for the deal.

p/s photos: Linda Chung Kar Yan