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Ambassador Ziyad to attempt Guinness World Record....
Pakistan's A Wild Card For The Future


While the media has been focusing on the political and economic upheavals of Pakistan in recent months, one should not be oblivious to the growing danger of Pakistan as a time bomb of sorts. Unless we engage Pakistan in a pragmatic manner, unless we have a 'democratically inclined and transparent' governance in the near future, Pakistan could prove to be "hot and trouble spot" of the future. Just to cite one factor - it has an unwieldy population now of 176m, which is slated to grow to 336m by 2030 and 446m by 2050. For such a large populous nation that is highly fragmented, it sure is a potent mix if Pakistan continues the way it has.
From Nomura strategy piece on Pakistan: In the past few weeks (and most notably in his 4 June major policy speech in Cairo), President Obama has gradually been unveiling a strategy which appears to be aimed at enhancing prospects for peace and stability throughout the Middle East and which seems to involve parallel diplomatic tracks from Bombay to Beirut. That process now looks to be accelerating as we enter a period which some commentators see as pivotal in determining the future of the region as a whole and where we judge stabilising Pakistan to be one of a handful of key objectives. While the Pakistan army’s recent push against the Taliban in the Swat valley has been broadly welcomed, concerns remain about its tactics and the related civilian casualties and refugee problem which may serve to make the authorities in Islamabad even less popular than previously. Much may now depend on the ability of the civil authorities to deliver immediate aid (including significant contributions from international donors) to the civilian population and to follow this up with the sort of long-term economic development which economic experts believe is essential to counter Islamic militancy.
Some recent claims by some experts (including US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton) that the threat posed by the Taliban to the Pakistan state is “existential” (or that it is likely to result in nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamic extremists) could be misguided, the army’s efforts in Swat have certainly not neutralised the Taliban’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks throughout Pakistan, which now appears to be its preferred modus operandi. Nevertheless, the Pakistan military has been encouraged by its success in Swat and, in a marked change of approach by the government, is now looking to expand its operations into Taliban-controlled frontier areas of the country, with advanced strikes being launched in mid-June in Waziristan (the main stronghold of the militant group Tehrik-i-Taliban). However, military experts judge that the army is likely to face significantly greater challenges than it did in Swat as militants disperse to other parts of the country (and, possibly, abroad) and as further humanitarian problems come into play as a result of the new offensive.
For all that, Pakistan’s political and economic fragility seems to have been eased – at least temporarily – by renewed US support (and sensitivity over drone missile strikes against suspected Taliban/al Qa’ida targets in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border region) under the overall guidance of Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke who has publicly noted that stabilising Pakistan is essential to the achievement of US/Nato objectives in Afghanistan. Additionally, the US seems to be reconciled to the prospect of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif returning to public office (following a recent high court decision to lift the ban on him) and possibly even driving through constitutional changes which would allow him to run for a third term as prime minister. However, any such move looks likely to deepen the rift between Mr Sharif and President Asif Ali Zardari (who is already widely seen as weakened by recent events in Pakistan) and could lead to renewed political turbulence and weak governance.
One more factor which we believe is likely to come into play with a new Indian government in its renewed efforts to broker a long-term settlement over Kashmir between India and Pakistan. However, it remains to be seen whether a weak Pakistan government could deliver on its side of any agreement, especially if the widely held view is correct that influential elements in Pakistan would prefer the current impasse to continue. There is, therefore, a significant risk in our view that any real progress in negotiations could precipitate further terrorist attacks in India originating from within Pakistan’s borders, with consequent serious implications for
regional security.
- Stock market has gained 20.23% ytd from January to mid-June 2009. Yet it has been one of the worst performers in Asia. But it was fell by 58% in 2008.
- Weak domestic economy, security and political instability and military action in the Swat valley have led to a sell-off by investors. Capital flight has raised the need for additional external assistance to finance defense and reconstruction spending and external debt payments
- Valuations: With stock market rally in early 2009, P/E ratio has improved from the lowest level at 6.31 on January 2, 2009 to 10.89 on April 24 as improving current account balance based on strong remittances and aid from IMF and other countries enhanced market sentiment. However, with several risks to the stock market such as war in the Swat valley, widening trade deficit, portfolio outflows and deteriorating domestic consumption, the P/E ratio has slightly decreased to 9.54, the lowest level in Asia, in mid-June 2009
- Outflow of portfolio and other foreign investment: Domestic and foreign investors turned net sellers in FY 2009 and sold US$ 1.1billion during July 2008 to May 2009. They were net buyers in FY 2008 at US$ 87.2billion. Foreign investors have sold shares worth US$ 290million until mid-June in FY 2009
- Outlook for 2009: Easing monetary policy trend and low P/E ratio level relative to other Asian countries might be attractive. But ongoing risks such as political uncertainty, security risk, slowing GDP growth, weak manufacturing sector and tight budget conditions can hurt investor sentiment and lead further outflows of FIIs
- Too much reliance on foreign funds and lack of strong positive stimulus will limit gains in the stock market
- Terrorist attacks and outflows of foreign investment have made the stock market the cheapest in the region
- Progression of ongoing military action and political stability will be key factors for the stock market ahead
Currency: - In 2009, Pakistan rupee has been deprecated 2.9% from January to mid-June
- In 2008, Pakistan rupee depreciated 13.7% against U.S. dollar. It started to depreciate from March 2008 and sharply declined until October 2008 when IMF announced an assistance package. It was reflecting foreign investor’s concerns about political instability, weak economic conditions and high inflation
- Outlook for currency: Pakistan rupee is expected to remain weak. Sustainability of BOP is challenging amid declining FDI, risk of portfolio outflows and scarce forex reserves. Security risks due to ongoing war against Taliban,impact of contracting exports and slowing remittances on the current account, and weak economic growth will also have a negative impact on Pakistan rupee
Bonds: - Pakistan 10-year government bond price in 2009 increased by 26.6% from January 2009 to mid-June and yields decreased by 26.9% until mid-June
- Moderating Inflation has provided central bank room to cut interest rate by 1% in April 2009. Analysts expect central bank to cut interest rate further which will put pressure on bond yields ahead
- Narrowing balance of payments (BOP) deficit due to surplus of current account improved market sentiment. Successful payment of government debt in February 2009 (US$ 500 million Eurobond and US$ 17million on account of interest payment) reduced fears of Pakistan debt repayment capacity
- Ratings: S&P downgraded Pakistan’s credit rating to ‘CCC’, the lowest level in 10 years, from ‘CCC+’ in November 2008 due to deteriorating BOP and delay in securing external assistance. Moody’s rated Pakistan’s debt at ‘B3’ in 2008 due to political risks and falling forex reserves. “Ratings can downgrade further if government does not show secured external assistance”
p/s photos: Zhang Xin Yu
The Asian Response


- 10 ASEAN nations planning for a crisis fund to tap from if they face severe liquidity crunch due to global financial crisis; Fund can also be used to purchase bad assets, recapitalize troubled financial institutions and private companies; ASEAN+3, ADB, IMF will contribute to the fund while World Bank has contributed $10bn; also include plans for stand-by liquidity facilities
- In spite of limited exposure to US bank losses, risks from external funding crunch, higher borrowing costs, bank panics and deposit withdrawals are growing for banks and corporates in Korea, HK and Taiwan
- Asian central banks had been injecting liquidity into banking system and cutting rates (discount/policy rate) and/or bank reserve requirements to ease liquidity squeeze and spike in short-term rates (swap, overnight, inter-bank rates and spreads) since Sep; Some banned short-selling, guaranteeing deposits, considering fiscal stimulus; following global central bank intervention, these rates have somewhat eased in recent days
- Australia: $7.3bn stimulus for pensioners, middle and low-income groups, first-time home buyers; additional stimulus may follow; deposit guarantees; cut overnight cash rate to 6% from 7%, offering 6-mo/1-yr repos; Term Deposit lending facility, expanded types of collateral, loan maturity under bank lending facility as difference b/w inter-bank and overnight indexed swap rate surged; doubled swap agreement with Fed from $10bn to $20bn; banned short selling; to purchase $3.2 bn in residential-backed mortgage securities to help small lenders offer home loans
- Japan: supplementary budget for fiscal stimulus; providing unlimited dollar funds to banks at a fixed rate against pooled collateral until Jan-09 under swap agreement with Fed; eased rates under lending facility, expanded range of bonds under repos, suspended program of selling bank shares; Injecting liquidity amid spike in Yen overnight LIBOR; banks' exposure to Lehman had led to decline in stock prices and short halt in trading on Sep 15
- India: Raised cap and credit cost on external borrowing of firms; cut interest rate 100pbs to 8%; conducting 14 day Repos to help banks provide credit to MFs; allowed banks to lend to MFs against CDs; Allowed Savings bond holders to borrow from banks against govt paper; to infuse capital into commercial banks to raise CAR up to 12%; cut bank reserve ratio thrice in Oct from 9% to 6.5% (first time in 5 yrs); raised FII limit in corporate bonds; raised interest rate on non-resident deposits by 50bps following similar move in Sep; eased limits on banks to raise foreign capital, restrictions on FII equity investment; eased Liquidity Adjustment Facility; continues to sell FX reserves
- HK: to use forex reserves to guarantee bank deposits, set up a fund for banks to access capital; Cut base rate by 150bps to 2% twice in Oct to contain jump in HIBOR; providing additional liquidity to banks via 3-mo repo window, expanded acceptable collateral
- Korea: cut 7-day repo rate 75bps to 4.25% and lowered the base rate 75bps on loans to SMEs amid high commercial paper and loan refinancing costs, household debt; up to $100 bn to guarantee maturing foreign currency debt; to use forex reserves to inject $30 bn liquidity in won-dollar swap market after an initial $10bn; might buy govt bonds from the market to reduce USD shortage; temporary ban on short selling
- Taiwan: Guaranteed bank deposits; Cut discount rate on 10-day loans to 3.25% on Oct 9 (second time in 2 weeks following first cut since 2003), cut reserve ratio (first time in 8 yrs) and ratio for passbook deposits; injecting liquidity into foreign-currency interbank market; lending via repos to insurance companies w/ extended maturity up to 180 days; banned short selling; instructed 4 major funds and state-owned banks to buy shares after stock market fell to 3-yr low on Sep 15
- Indonesia: allowed commercial banks to use central bank debt and govt bonds as secondary reserves; extended FX Swap tenor to 1 month; passage of foreign currency via banks for firms; abolished limit of daily balance position; eased foreign currency min reserve req; Cut bank reserve ratio 1.58bps to 7.5%; exempted banks from mark-to-market rule, eased rules/cap for firms to buy back shares; Suspended trading on Oct 8/9 following 10% slide in stock market; banned short selling for Oct; injected over 3bn via 6-day repo; lowered overnight repo rate, adjusted rate of liquidity facility; might increase infrastructure spending, fiscal stimulus for exporting firms, households
- New Zealand: overnight Cash Rate cut 100bps to 6.5%; introduced opt-in deposit guarantee scheme; accepting (longer term) bank paper in daily market operations, ABSs from local banks for swapping foreign cash into NZ dollars
- China: Chinese banks reluctant to extend loans to foreign banks in the interbank market; reduced 1-yr lending rate (second time in 3 weeks, first since 2002) by 27bp to 6.93% and 10yr deposit rate to 3.87% and cut bank reserve requirements by 50bp to 17%; eliminated stamp duty on stock purchases with plans to buy shares in state-owned banks; to introduce short selling and margin trading to ease pressure on share prices
- Singapore: guaranteed deposits; Injecting liquidity via market operations; prepared to provide further liquidity if necessary and also to individual banks amid spike in 1-mo and 3-mo SIBOR, BEA bank run, CDS also rising; but rates have eased somewhat following central bank measures
- Malaysia: guaranteed deposits; Might inject liquidity, move interest rates if necessary; planning for an economic stabilization stimulus
- Pakistan: declining capital inflows/outflows in inter-bank and open market causing currency depreciation; central bank injected $100-200 bn, raised limit on investment bonds and term finance certificates under banks' statutory requirement
- Easing commodity prices, peaking of inflation, growing risks to exports, economic growth might also shift central banks' bias towards monetary easing; Taiwan, Pakistan, Vietnam had earlier intervened in stock market by narrowing trading band, introducing stabilization fund to contain volatility; India, S.Korea, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesian intervening in forex market to contain downward pressure on currency (led by capital outflows, decline in external balances)
p/s photos: Haruna Yabuki
Roubini On Emerging Markets' Risks

You cannot afford to ignore Nouriel Roubini nowadays, especially since he has been so correct over the past 12 months. Roubini has now latched onto the risks spreading to emerging markets' debts and balance sheet frailty. First thing first, Malaysia is not on the list (phew), but Indonesia, South Korea and India are. How do these risks play out in the mentioned countries? The currency will be under immense pressure, local rates will have to jump sky high to protect value and flight of capital, foreign investment will dry up quickly, short term foreign investments will flee, government and corporate bonds will be downgraded, cost of borrowing will jump, companies on high leverage will suffocate ...
Today we focus on those emerging economies that are falling victim – or are at risk of falling victim – to the ongoing global financial crisis. The escalation of the crisis revealed or exacerbated existing vulnerabilities, such as current account deficits, that were ignored when times were good - ie capital was plentiful. Emerging Market sovereign bond spreads over U.S. Treasuries have risen significantly, more than doubling since late August. Several emerging economies – including Iceland – are in talks with the IMF or regional institutions to provide capital in the face of the global liquidity shortage. While it is still unclear what the role the IMF will have in resolving the crisis, there is no doubt that the debate on its role in international crisis management has been revived.
Iceland
Iceland has been at the forefront of the global credit crisis. What was essentially a banking crisis has turned into a national crisis as Iceland’s banks appear too big for the government to rescue.
Highly leveraged, Iceland’s banks heavily relied on wholesale funding to finance their aggressive expansion abroad. With the rapid depreciation of the local currency and the seize-up of credit markets, Iceland’s banks were having trouble refinancing their debt and appeared headed for collapse when the government stepped in and nationalized the three biggest lenders.
Now reports suggest Iceland’s government is poised to announce a reported $6 billion rescue package from the IMF. While such a package would be a positive step in providing liquidity, there is no question that a severe economic contraction is coming. Some analysts predict Icelandic GDP could shrink by 5-10% after almost 5.0% growth in 2007.
Hungary
Also hard hit by the global credit crisis is Hungary. While it’s not suffering a banking crisis a la Iceland (in the sense that its banking sector is mostly foreign-owned, rather than made up of highly leveraged, internationalized domestic banks), it is similar to Iceland in that the global credit crisis has exposed long-simmering vulnerabilities. High levels of foreign currency lending, slow growth (1.3% in 2007), twin deficits (both current account and budget), and heavy reliance on non-deposit foreign funding all contributed to making Hungarian assets sell-off targets.
The ECB came to Hungary’s rescue last week, saying it would lend as much as EUR5 billion ($6.7 billion) to Hungary’s central bank to help revive the local credit market. But the verdict is still out on whether the ECB credit line and government measures are enough to prevent Hungary from becoming an ongoing hotspot.
Given Hungary’s woes, eyes are focusing on the rest of Eastern Europe for signs of trouble. The slowdown in the region’s key export market, the Eurozone, is expected to dent growth across the region. Meanwhile, high current-account deficits and widespread foreign currency lending are particular risk factors. Poland and the Czech Republic are considered among the least vulnerable, but they are far from immune. Meanwhile the Baltics, Bulgaria, and Romania have long been on analysts’ radar as particularly weak links.
Baltics
All three Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) boomed over the last seven years and posted double-digit growth rates at their peak, helped by cheap credit from Scandinavian parent banks and EU membership in 2004. Before the the global credit crisis reached fever-pitch, these economies were already headed for a sharp slowdown, with Latvia and Estonia now officially in recession.
There is no question that the global credit crisis will exacerbate the Baltics' slowdown, but will it lead to an Iceland-level crisis? The risk is that foreign capital inflows could dry up and lead to an even sharper slowdown that could infect the financial sector and trigger devaluations. But there are some factors that suggest the sharp slowdown might not evolve into a full-fledged, Iceland-level crisis. For one, external deficits in the Baltics are funded to a large extent by inflows from Swedish parent banks, and sharply cutting off credit would not be in these banks' best interest. Two, substantial foreign ownership of banking assets limits the governments’ contingent liabilities, as Swedish parent banks would be expected to provide support to their Baltic subsidiaries if they get into trouble. Three, the Baltics’ sharp slowdowns have led to speculation that devaluations (they have exchange rate pegs to the euro) could be in the offing. While devaluation cannot be completely ruled out, such fears may be overblown as these countries tend to have shallow financial markets, relative little hot capital, and successfully defended against speculative attacks earlier this year. Nevertheless, without devaluations, these countries' external competitiveness will likely continue to erode, which will impact their growth prospects.
Bulgaria and Romania
Bulgaria and Romania – the so-called ‘gravity defiers’ – are also on the short-list of CEE economies most at risk of being the next hotspots in the global credit crisis. Despite massive current-account deficits (projected to hit 23% of GDP in Bulgaria and 16% of GDP in Romania this year), booming credit growth, and high inflation, these economies have not hit slowdown mode yet – hence the term ‘gravity defiers’.
In the case of both countries, the financing of their current-account deficits has deteriorated, with foreign direct investment (seen as less subject to reversal than other forms of financing) only plugging about a third of Romania’s current account gap and over half of Bulgaria’s. As a result, these economies are highly susceptible to capital outflows, which would trigger a harsh real adjustment.
Another risk is these countries’ high degree of foreign currency lending, particularly notable in Romania which has a flexible exchange rate, meaning unhedged borrowers are highly exposed to currency swings. Romanian households’ high levels of foreign currency lending are similar to those in Hungary (55% in Romania vs. 60% in Hungary of total household loans). And like Hungary, Romania has a budget deficit of over 2% of GDP. Meanwhile, Bulgaria has a budget surplus, which potentially gives its government more room to maneuver if outflows trigger a sharp slowdown. Bulgaria and Romania will be key countries to watch as the global credit crisis unfolds.
Balkans
The negative effects from the credit crunch on the Balkan region have been limited so far. Growth has remained strong, ranging between 4.3% for Croatia and 8.2% for Serbia in Q1 08. Nonetheless, the significant widening of the current account deficit experienced by most of the countries is a source of concern as both external credit and FDI inflows are likely to slow. Croatia may feel severe pressures since it has the highest foreign debt in the region, at 90% of GDP, and the share of foreign currency mortgages and personal loans is near the level seen in Hungary.
Turkey
A number of analysts have cited Turkey as particularly vulnerable to global market turmoil given its large current account deficit. At 5.8% of GDP in 2007, Turkey’s deficit – while substantial – is lower than many of its emerging Europe peers. The financing quality, however, has deteriorated of late and it will be important to watch how this trend evolves. Compared to other CEE countries, however, Turkey is less likely to face a bank-related credit squeeze, since the banking sector is relatively liquid with a loan-to-deposit ratio well below 100% and since wholesale borrowing is a smaller fraction of banking sector liabilities. So while Turkey is not immune to the global credit crisis and will experience slower growth, it is much better placed than earlier in this decade to weather the storm.
Ukraine
Ukraine’s high reliance on external finance makes it particularly vulnerable in this global economic downturn and credit crunch, leading it to seek financial assistance from the IMF. Worsening macroeconomic fundamentals including persistent inflation and a widening trade deficit and domestic and regional political uncertainty have contributed to deposit outflow, tighter domestic money market rates and exchange rate volatility, increasing near term risks for Ukraine's banking sector. The value of the Ukrainian currency, the hryvnya, sank by 20% so far in October forcing the National Bank of Ukraine to intervene and sell dollars at an artificially low rate. Moreover, the equity markets fell over 70% this year.
South Africa
Despite a growth rebound to 4.9% in Q2 2008, South Africa cut its growth forecast to 3% for 2009 on worries that a global recession would depress export demand (especially of metals) and investment inflows needed to finance its current account deficit. The fall in commodity prices has pressured the Rand, which fell to its lowest level since 2003, and domestic equity markets. The South African Reserve Bank left its benchmark interest rate unchanged at 12% for a second consecutive time, even after inflation reached a record 13.6% in August. Meanwhile, President Thabo Mbeki's resignation ushered in a period of political and economic uncertainty.
UAE
The UAE is one of several oil exporters starting to feel the pinch from the reversal of speculative capital that flowed in early this year to bet on currency revaluation. Long-term project finance costs already tightened throughout the GCC earlier this year and the freezing of global credit markets exposed UAE banks which financed rapid credit growth with foreign not local borrowing. As a result, local interbank rates more than doubled to over 4.6% despite liquidity injections and a central bank liquidity provision for UAE banks. However, although Dubai’s liabilities might be much greater than its assets, most participants and ratings agencies still assume that the federal government (read Abu Dhabi, home of the largest sovereign wealth fund) will step in if they get into serious trouble. Yet, with the oil price and capital inflows falling the UAE’s surpluses and will be smaller next year even if its budget still balances and worries about Dubai’s property market are looming.
Kazakhstan
Despite its oil wealth, a reliance on short-term borrowing by its banks abroad has left Kazakhstan, one of the few oil exporters to run a current account deficit, exposed. However, unlike some of its neighbors, it will use domestic funding including the $27 billion National Oil Fund to cushion its economy. But with the oil price dropping and new output delayed, Kazakhstan is set for much slower growth next year, particularly as its previously bubbly property market is cooling quickly.
Pakistan
Pakistan, recently hit by a political crisis, is also on the verge of a balance of payments crisis as large capital outflows and decline in forex reserves – below-adequacy levels – pose risk to finance the oil-led ballooning fiscal and current account deficits, and external debt payments. To prevent debt default, the government is seeking $10-15bn in loans from IMF, ADB and World Bank and might approach strategic donors like Saudi Arabia and China. The stock market and currency slump have also led to liquidity injections by central bank along with restrictions on stock trading, short selling, and the establishment of a stabilization fund.
Indonesia
A single day double-digit plunge in stock indices in early-October pulled down Indonesia’s stock market and helped push the index down over 40% year to date, leading authorities to suspend trading and ban short-selling. Capital outflows, rupiah decline and credit tightening have invited central bank intervention in money and currency markets. But the rundown of forex reserves poses significant risk to the subsidy-laden fiscal deficit and commodity correction-hit current account. Balance of payments risks are only exacerbated by the high foreign-currency denominated debt causing the government to seek loans from World Bank and other multilateral institutions.
South Korea
South Korea is the most vulnerable of Asian countries to a sudden stop of financial flows. Korea looks set for another financial crisis given its vulnerabilities that include: the highest loan-to-deposit ratio in the region, rapid growth of short-term foreign debt, a current account deficit, a slowing property market, high food/fuel prices squeezing small- and medium-sized enterprises in the construction industry as well as consumers and large corporations facing an export slowdown. Its currency is down roughly 30% year-to-date despite the announcement of a bank support package as foreign investors have pulled out of Korean assets in a flight-to-safety and de-leveraging that marks the global credit crisis. Many fear Korea's credit crisis will shape up to a repeat of 1997 but others believe that, due to its large war chest of forex reserves and its status as net creditor to the world, Korea's interbank dollar funding squeeze is unlikely to become a 1997 redux. The most worrisome sources of a potential Korean credit crisis are not the foreign currency bank debt built up from hedging exporters' USD shorts and the interest rate arbitrage that resulted as a by-product. Such foreign debt can surely exacerbate the de-leveraging that Korea’s bank sector faces, however the real fire starter for a Korean crisis is domestic debt. Korea needs to restructure after having over-invested in construction/real estate companies and over-lent to households. With a slowing economy endangering asset quality, Korean banks will need to get pickier about who they loan to.
Argentina
The global financial meltdown has put Argentine's private pension assets in jeopardy. Argentina's government could move to take over the management of $28.7 billion in private pension funds that sharply declined in value this year due to global turmoil. The government is attempting to increase the pool of money it can borrow from in order to meet debt obligations next year. As of now, retirement and pension fund administrators manage private pension accounts for 9.5 million depositors, of which some 40% are active contributors. Essentially, most mandatory funds flow into the private pension system would now become part of the government's pay-as-you-go public pension scheme. Besides that, the government would have access to some USD 1.2bn per year in new flows currently deposited in the system. The idea of using social security funds to avoid a default (or to pay the debt) next year should cause a sharp drop in confidence in the country and in its government.
Venezuela
In Venezuela, the key problem is the fact that its sovereign wealth fund, known as Fonden, holds about $300 million in debt instruments that Lehman had agreed to cash. With Lehman’s bankruptcy, Venezuela will have a hard time selling the debt. Moreover, the Venezuelan's sovereign wealth fund has a significant amount ($2billion) allocated in structured notes that have lost part of their value amidst crumbling markets, and therefore they are hard to cash to cover expenses. Meanwhile the fall in the oil price may crimp Venezuela’s fiscal expansionism.
BRICs
Although the BRIC economies are not as vulnerable as these over-exposed and smaller Emerging markets, they do not appear immune to the global economic downturn and credit crunch.
The financial crisis has triggered downwards revisions in economic growth in Brazil for 2009. While the country is set to post 5.1% this year, the forecast for 2009 is 2.8%. The financial crisis and decline in commodity prices which tent to reduce the amount of exports contribute to lower growth.
So far, Russian consumers have remained insulated from the loss of wealth in the equity market and troubles that Russian banks face in rolling over their debt, but growth is likely to slow to 5-6% next year from 7% plus in 2007. Meanwhile financing costs are on the rise, eating into corporate profits and the falling oil price may limit a planned investment spree, particularly as a large amount of Russia’s savings are tied up in the domestic banking sector and attempts to avoid a bust in the Moscow property sector.
India is taking a severe hit from the global financial crisis with the stock market down over 50% year to date, FII outflows crossing $10bn and the currency plunging over 20% year to date. While the central bank is injecting liquidity, easing bank credit and capital inflows, cutting policy rate to contain risks to the financial sector and downtrend in asset markets, correction in the near-term seems inevitable. Double-digit inflation, high interest rates and global liquidity crunch will significantly impact domestic demand and industrial activity in 2008-09 pulling down the recent boom. Moreover, twin deficits, both approaching 10% of GDP, pose a challenge as forex reserves decline.
Q3 marked the fifth consecutive slowing of Chinese real GDP growth. Slowing industrial production and real fixed investment are suggesting more weakness ahead particularly if the worst consumer sentiment since 2003 persists. Slowing growth implies fewer commodity imports – even if government sponsored infrastructure projects pick up some slack – clouding the outlook for countries like Brazil, Chile and Australia, among others. The Chinese government fiscal and monetary responses, which have already begun, could cushion its fall and aid in its rebalancing. Yet falling asset prices are taking their toll on local and national fiscal coffers and corporate profits and consumption could be the next shoe to drop as robust retail sales may not stand up to slowing income growth.
p/s photo: Son Dam Bi