Estimated Demand For USD

This has to be the most interesting graphs I have seen for a long time. It has been able to plot US financing needs, US deficit, and get this.... the estimated official demand for USD!!?? Obviously central banks are pulling back a lot, and even the average investor have been shying away now... after the silly risk aversion that caused the silliness flight to USD a few months back. Looks like a long haul for the USD from here on.... which is actually good news for US equities... always look for the silver lining. As you enter a tunnel, it becomes darker and darker... it is always darkest before dawn... unless the spark of light from afar is an oncoming train!!!

By brad setser

If I had to pick a single graph to explain the evolution of the United States’ balance of payments – and thus, indirectly, the entire story of the world’s macroeconomic “imbalances” – this would be it.

All data is in dollar billions, and is presented as a rolling four quarter sum.*

The red line is the United States current account deficit.

The black line is the United States financing need – defined as the sum of the current account deficit plus US outward FDI and US purchases of foreign long-term securities.** The dip in the total US financing need from mid 2005 to mid 2006 isn’t real. It reflects the impact of the Homeland Investment Act, a holiday on the repatriation of the foreign profits of US multinationals that produced a sharp fall in outward FDI.*** The rise in the United States financing need over the course of 2007 by contrast is real; American investors bought the decoupling story and wanted to invest more abroad.

The shaded area represents official demand for US assets. The inflows from central banks that report data to the IMF and Norway are known. The inflows from central banks that don’t report and other sovereign funds are my own estimates. The key countries that do not report reserves are – in my judgment – China, Saudi Arabia and the other countries in the GCC. I have assumed that the dollar share of their reserves is closer to 70% than 60% (supporting evidence). I by contrast have assumed that the GCC’s sovereign funds have a diverse portfolio.

What does the graph tell us?

In my view, three things:

First, the rise in the US current account deficit from 2002 to 2006 is associated with a rise in official demand for US assets. The quarterly IMF data doesn’t extend back to the late 90s – or to the early 1980s. But trust me, that is a change from past periods when the US current account deficit expanded. To be sure, private investors abroad were also buying US assets. But the rise in the overall US financing need associated with the rise in the current account deficit wasn’t financed by a comparable rise in private demand for US assets.

Second, Official demand for US assets soared from the end of 2005 to the end of 2007 – even by the standards of this decade. That surge was hidden, as the majority came from countries that don’t transparently report the currency composition of their reserves (let alone their sovereign funds). But it happened. At the peak of official asset accumulation in late 2007 and early 2008, official demand for US assets (best I can tell, and if my estimates are off – do tell, and explain, with data) exceeded the total US financing need. Central banks and sovereign funds were financing both the US current account deficit and the “diversification” of private US portfolios. Absent that uptick in official demand, the US would have experienced a dollar crisis before it experienced a banking crisis.

Third, official demand for US assets has fallen quite sharply over the last four quarters. Paul Krugman is right. The US depended on China’s central bank – and other official investors – far less over the last four quarters than it did in late 2007 and early 2008. The collapse in gross private capital flows during the crisis rebounded in the United States’ favor, as Americans scaled back their investment abroad faster than foreigners scaled back their investment in the US. The fiscal deficit may be up, but US “dependence” on central banks for financing fell sharply.

At least through the first quarter. The second quarter of 2009 will be to be different. Reserve growth seems to have resumed.

But there is little doubt that reserve growth slowed sharply from mid 2008 to mid 2009. The countries that report detailed data on their reserves to the IMF reduced their dollar reserves from the end of q1 2008 to the end of q1 2009 by about $130 billion. That is a fact not a guess. Guessing the overall total requires guessing what China (and Saudi Arabia did). But there is little doubt that China’s overall reserve growth slowed – so unless it was diversifying into the dollar, its growth in its dollar reserves must also have slowed.

Wait. Doesn’t the US data (including the Fed custodial accounts) tell a somewhat different story? And doesn’t the US data show record inflows into Treasuries?

All true.

My estimates of dollar reserve growth (and the available data from the IMF) are at odds with the US data showing a pick up in official demand for Treasuries.

What gives?

My explanation: central banks reserve managers pulled funds from banks, the US agencies, and private fund managers – producing an uptick in demand for Treasuries.

We know that this happened inside the US. From the end of q1 08 to the end of q1 09 central banks reduced their dollar deposits in US banks by about $200 billion – providing a lot of the funds that flowed into Treasuries. I would bet the same thing happened globally.

p/s photo: Fay Hokulani

Pounding The Pound

The fall in value of the British pound is a problem for mainland Europe and will be added to regular talks on exchange rate issues when G7 finance ministers meet in February. In the past year, sterling has lost around 30 percent versus the dollar, 20 percent versus the euro and more than 40 percent versus the yen. Late Wednesday, the pound bounced back to $1.3977 after slipping to a 23-year low of $1.3618. The British pound has fallen to a 7-year low against the US dollar and a record low against the Japanese Yen.

Bank of England Gov. Mervyn King on Tuesday night signaled that the central bank was set to seriously consider buying up a range of assets in coming weeks in an effort to jumpstart stalled lending to businesses and households. He also outlined potential "quantitative easing" measures that could be used to boost the money supply, or effectively print money, in the face of a steep contraction that threatens to take inflation below the central bank's 2% inflation target. The market is afraid that the UK will turn into the next Spain or Greece. Over the past few months, they have been working overtime to inject more stimulus into the economy, but the more that they spend, the worse impact it has on the UK’s fiscal position. Deteriorating public finances has been the primary motivation for the recent downgrades of sovereign debt ratings by Standard and Poor’s. The FSA has dismissed this rumor but that doesn’t mean that the UK can’t be put on credit watch negative which would be one step before a downgrade.

Investors are selling now and asking questions later because a downgrade would mean more losses for the British pound. Whenever a country loses its AAA rating, funds that are mandated to invest in only AAA assets need to liquidate and shift their positions elsewhere. We have seen this with Spain and could see it again with the UK.

Data from the U.K. labor market showed December jobless claims rose by 77,900, while November claims were revised up to show an increase of 83,100 from an initial estimate of 75,700. The U.S. and the U.K. face very similar predicaments, from a deepening recession to a damaged financial system. Both are orchestrating massive bank bailouts and attempting to assist struggling homeowners. Both are ramping up government spending even as they rely on financing from overseas investors. And both countries have central banks that have slashed interest rates and opened the door to unconventional ways of stimulating the economy.investors not only dumped the pound earlier this week, but also shed U.K. stocks and government bonds, sending their yields up. Such a combination, if sustained, would raise the fear that investors are exiting from a host of U.K. assets, creating a vicious cycle that is difficult to arrest.

Investors worry that Britain could end up fully nationalizing more of its banks, adding more pressure on its balance sheet. It already owns 43% of Lloyds and 70% of Royal Bank of Scotland and nationalized lenders Northern Rock PLC and Bradford & Bingley PLC last year.

After a steady weakening in value for most of 2008, it looks like the British pound will be in for continued weakness for at least the first half of 2009. The problems with UK are very similar to the US. But the similarity ends there - pound got trashed but the USD found strength. They both had the unholy economic trinity of problems - high debt, property prices, an overvalued currency. However, the thing that puts the UK on a different plane:

a) UK property prices has been on a more massive over-valuation compared to the US property

b) at least the USD is a reserve currency still, a luxury buffer the British pound does not have

c) the UK is not using the euro, which may offer some protection by being in a grouping, there is very little incentive for any groupings to help out the pound, in fact the entire chain of events may make the UK to hasten the process to adopt the euro... you didn't want to adopt the euro before because of the perceived strength of the pound and the need to have monetary independence, now in extreme weakness, the UK may have little choice but to take on the euro to replace the increasingly decimated value of the pound

d) in terms of debt, US consumers have loaded up on property financing and credit card debts, the situation is not dis-similar in the UK

e) the credit crisis which decimated banks capital in the US is reflective of many UK institutions as London rivals New York in terms as international finance centers, hence the mode of operations and exposure are very similar as well

All said, the British pound should make new lows in the coming weeks and months. Nationalising of banks will be a hot topic in both US and UK. Talks of adopting the euro and dumping the pound will take on greater fuel.

p/s photos: Elanne Kong Yuk Lam