Showing posts with label bad bank policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bad bank policy. Show all posts

Opinions On Bad Bank Idea


    Overview: Geithner aims to add private funding as a new component of proposals to address the toxic debt clogging banks’ balance sheets next to government guarantees of ring-fenced toxic assets. Aspects of the plan that have been settled include a new round of injections of taxpayer funds into banks, targeted at those identified by regulators as most in need of new capital. Previously, the comprehensive solution that aimed at keeping banks in private hands as outlined in Tim Geithner's confirmation hearing was the set-up of an 'aggregator bank' that buys toxic assets. The main sticking point is the toxic asset valuation issue--> markets gain on prospect of easing mark-to-market accounting rules. Major headache is systemic impact of too-big-to-fail banks. Treasury will outline action plan on February 10.

  • Amount of toxic assets: WSJ says combination of guarantee and aggegator bank likely, with the latter buying about $2 trillion in toxic assets. Compare with size of U.S. originated shadow banking system pushing for re-intermediation and access to central bank liquidity is $10 trillion (see Geithner speech June 9). Of these, about $6T in U.S., $4t abroad according to Fed research based on flow of funds data (compare with Goldman estimates (not online) that amount of toxic assets in U.S. is at $5.7T). Moreover, IMF notes in October GFSR that $10T is the likely amount of asset deleveraging at global banks. Simon Johnson estimates U.S. bank rescue will cost $3-4T with net cost to taxpayer of about $1-2T or range of 5-10% of GDP as in past banking crises (via Fortune).
  • RGE: for U.S. banks: $1.1T in total loan losses, $600-700bn in current mark-to-market losses based on derivatives and cash bond prices. Compare with Chris Whalen (IRA) estimate for accumulated bank charge offs for 2009 in the neighborhood of $1 trillion vs. $1.5 trillion in Tier 1 Risk Based Capital at all US banks. "The good news, though, is that 2/3 to 3/4 of that loss number comes from the top 4 - Citigroup, Bank of America, JPMorganChase and Wells Fargo, in that order of risk profile."
  • Industry proposal with private sector involvement (via Fortune): The idea, as drafted and as articulated by Citigroup's Flexner, is for the government to create a massive new fund to lend money at a fair price to professional investors -- pension funds, hedge funds, private equity funds and endowment funds -- for the sole purpose of providing reliable long-term financing to allow these investors to buy the various "toxic assets" in the secondary market that are now frozen on the balance sheets of financial institutions the world over--> The bet would be that these securities would increase in value over time
  • similarly Michael Jaliman 'MBS Economic Freedom Bonds' (without temporary nationalization) and Luigi Spaventa's Brady Bond proposal to clear toxic asset overhang and sever market and funding liquidity negative feedback loop.
  • Jeffrey Sachs: The bank can be recapitalized at fair value to taxpayers and without inducing a squeeze on bank capital and lending. The government can swap 20 in government bonds for the 20 in toxic assets plus contingent warrants on bank capital, the value of which depends on the eventual sale price of the toxic assets. The government would then dispose of the 20 in toxic assets at a market price over the course of the next year or two and exercise its contingent warrants at that time. During the period of liquidating the toxic assets, the government would exercise a kind of receivership over the banks in order to prevent asset stripping or 'Hail-Mary' incentives on the part of managers --> In this process, there are no taxpayer bailouts, and there is also no squeeze on bank capital resulting from the exchange of toxic assets at less than face value.
  • Nouriel Roubini: in the bad bank model the government may overpay for the bad assets as the true value of them is uncertain; even in the guarantee model there can be such implicit over-payment (or over-guarantee that is not properly priced). Thus, paradoxically nationalization may be a more market friendly solution: it creates the biggest hit for common and preferred shareholders of clearly insolvent institutions and – possibly – even the unsecured creditors in case the bank insolvency is too large; it provides a fair upside to the tax-payer; it can resolve the problem of government managing the bad assets by reselling most of the assets and liabilities of the bank to new private shareholders after a clean-up of the bank.
  • Robert Pozen: Here's a practical solution to the valuation issue: suppose the Treasury estimates that a toxic asset is worth $700,000. It would pay the bank $560,000 in cash (=80%) plus a capital certificate for $140,000 (=20%). If the government later sold that security for $660,000, the bank would receive an additional cash payment of $80,000 (80% of $100,000, the excess of $660,000 over $560,000). The Treasury would receive the remaining $20,000 of the excess. On the other hand, if the government later sold the security for $550,000, the bank would receive nothing more. The Treasury would absorb a loss of $10,000.
  • Willem Buiter (similar arguments by Stiglitz/Romer/Soros): Government should finance and run temporarily one or more good banks, i.e. buy the good assets for which there IS a price by definition and leave the bad assets with the old legacy banks and its shareholders, creditors. Latter will most likely fail and at that point Chapter 7 and 11 are ready--> the state meets its three key objectives: first, its short-run economic stabilisation and crisis-fighting objective; second, its medium and long-term banking sector incentive-enhancing, moral-hazard-minimising objective; and third, its fairness objectives: the polluter pays or, you break it, you own it.
  • Paul Krugman: The only way to make effectively insolvent banks viable again without explicit but temporary government takeover and restructuring is if the government pays much more for toxic assets than private buyers are willing to offer. There is no guarantee that paying near fair value prices will make banks solvent again which would require additional capital injections. A better approach would be to do what the government did with zombie savings and loans at the end of the 1980s: it seized the defunct banks, cleaning out the shareholders. Then it transferred their bad assets to a special institution, the Resolution Trust Corporation; paid off enough of the banks’ debts to make them solvent; and sold the fixed-up banks to new owners.
  • Luigi Zingales: Avoid putting any further taxpayer money at risk at all and mandate a sizable debt to equity swap and adjust distributional issues with equity warrants (change in legislation needed).
  • Nationalization (Swedish Model):
    Pro: write down toxic assets to market value, then nationalize insolvent banks (receivership) in order to align institution's and taxpayer incentives (Zombie banks are likely to engage in gambling), wipe out equity holders (maybe also debt restructuring needed) instead of subsidizing them with taxpayer money, dismiss management, dispose of them via a new RTC (or bad bank), wind down unviable banks, refinance viable ones, start afresh.
    Con:
    Government is not in the business of running a commercial bank; potentially large upfront government outlays, what do you do with debt holders?, stigma.
  • Backstop guarantee of ring-fenced assets on banks' balance sheets of Citi and BoA:
    Pro: Little upfront outlays for the government
    Con: Open-end government commitment, question of asset valuation unresolved; assets that are good today may turn bad tomorrow (coming loan losses) which may need additional capital, persistent lack of transparency on who holds what, ongoing subsidization of existing share- and debt holders by taxpayers, banks might need additional capital injections.
  • Bad Bank or Aggregator Bank (to be run by FDIC):
    Pro: Government purchase of toxic assets off banks' balance sheets contributes to price discovery and helps deleverage balance sheets.
    Con:
    Big question is at what price should toxic assets be bought? If government buys at market values, many banks will be insolvent anyway as they have to mark down asset values to new price. If price is too high, taxpayer is once again subsidizing eqyity and debt holders. Bernanke advocates 'hold-to-maturity' prices above current market prices.
  • 'Bad bank' without nationalization and full writedown of toxic assets to market value is reminiscent of super-SIV that industry did not want to back itself due to asymmetric exposures.
  • IMF: Fair value accounting has its problems but it is still the best option available.

p/s photos: Kim Ok Bin

The Fate of Bank of America



Bank of America is being sold down as if its going to zero. Owing to the volatility, that forces many pundits to take a stand on the stock. If you believe it will survive, the share price at $4-$6 is very attractive. If you believe it will be nationalised, then basically it will be going to zero. The bets are huge, the opinions given will make or break many funds' positions.

Bank of America's stock is now selling at 0.28x expected 2009 revenues; 6.9x expected 2009 earnings; 0.19x stated book value; 0.50x tangible book value. Its market capitalization is 3.4% of its total deposits and 1.7% of its assets. These numbers are clear, investors believe that this bank is about to fail and be nationalized by the United States government. If they believed that it would continue as an operating entity it is unlikely that the bank would be selling at such a low value. Generally, with such numbers staring at your face, it will be difficult to think the bank is insolvent.

Those on the sell side:

a) One reason for this conviction, on the part of investors, is Bank of America's acquisition of Merrill Lynch. It is felt that either the company did not do the appropriate due diligence before making this acquisition, or that the company lacked the ability to understand how bad Merrill's problems were. In either case a lose/lose situation.

b) Management is now fighting back. In an article in today's Wall Street Journal it is reported that the United States coerced Bank of America into buying Merrill against management's will. This article could only have come from an interview with Bank of America's management. The point to investors is "we knew what was going on but we had no choice." That serves no purpose other than to absolve management of BoA from the Merrill Lynch acquisition. Not good PR, and a hint of things to come. This, to some extent, alleviates the questions concerning management's competence. It does not take away the belief on the part of investors that the company's woes are so significant that it will fail.

Those on the buy side:

a) The fears does not make sense. In the fourth quarter, Bank of America's deposits rose by almost a net $9 billion. Its loan loss provision was $8.5 billion but 27% of this was a reserve build and the whole amount was a non-cash charge. It took close to $8 billion in losses related to securities. The portion that was non cash in nature may have been as high as 75%.

b) The point is that this bank is cash flow positive. The danger of failing is exaggerated. Plus, the United States is now committed to keep it in business.

My view is that all things being equal, when selling is so concentrated, it is always better to err on the side of caution. Some things are better not to bet on even on the potential of a big payout. BoA is no small thing, it is the biggest thing the US government has left to save on. BoA has already received $45 billion of TARP money. Prior to receiving the bailout funds, its market cap was $159 billion. Now it is less than $30 billion. Obviously something is very wrong. It is certainly not a short selling thing anymore.

This experience would serve all investors very well, when something looks too good to be true (i.e. BoA going on very cheaply), it probably is. The trick is to try and find the pink elephant in the room. How can so many miss the pink elephant? How can BoA, seemingly one of the healthier banks, one that even had the audacity to buy Merrill Lynch and Countrywide just a few months ack when all banks and mortgage companies were collapsing right-left and centre.

The price is always right, and there are always people who will have some additional information than the rest. You just have to do more homework. If BoA did not buy Countrywide and Merrill Lynch (particularly the latter), it would not have to come to this. Obviously the management is at fault.

The problem is BoA's lack of capital. BoA has been on the forefront in share buybacks. Since 1998 it has bought back $62 billion in shares thus reducing its tangible capital ratio. Back in 1998 BoA's capital was 5%, now it stands at just 2.8%. At that level, it is very easy to see the capital being completely wiped out, especially when you look at the toxic assets under Merrill Lynch. The TARP funds does not add to the banks' capital. BoA was forced to write down $4.4 billion in the latest quarter, or 1.8% of its loan portfolio. But that whittled down BoA's capital down to 2.6%. Thats way much weaker than even Citigroup.

For Bank of America the key figure is the fact that the bank only had $1.3 billion of reserves tied to $255 billion in first lien mortgages or about 0.56%. Such a low reserve amount is shocking and will likely be the point by which Bank of America faces the worst pain going forward. The bank’s total managed consumer portfolio was better, yet still only had reserves of 2.83% on a $694 billion portfolio. In addition, its total commercial portfolio of $380 billion only had reserves amounting to 1.96%. If unemployment were to peak at 9%, you can see that there will be substantive writeoffs over the first two quarters of 2009, which will see the reserves and capital adequacy elements being wiped out. On those areas, BoA is in the worst shape among the big banks, even worse than Citigroup, a lot worse off.

Put in another way, Bank of America has assets of $1.836 trillion and derivatives of $39.979 trillion, (mostly swaps). With the demise of the Shadow Banking System (non bank financial institutions), trading derivatives is much more difficult. If marked to market, one wonders just how much of a loss would be realized in this $39.979 trillion portfolio. Nobody, who will talk about it anyway, seems to know. It wouldn't take much to wipe out $1.8 trillion in assets.

Buying Merrill Lynch did boost BoA's capital but Merrill also reported a $15 billion loss in 4Q, which prompted BoA to ask for an additional $20 billion in TARP funds ontop of the earlier $25 billion. Plus it got a $100 billion in guarantee from the government. BoA is now hinging on the 'bad bank' idea, which will buy up the toxic assets at a premium. But the bank needs it quick. Chances are it will not be easy to start the 'bad bank' idea as even the $800 billion stimulus plan is facing hurdles just to get it past the lawmakers.

The 'bad bank' idea needs at least $2 trillion to start with. How do you think that will go down with the Congress and Senate? Geithner may be doing a a twist to the bad bank idea, in that the fund may not be buying the toxic assets but will give a kind of guarantee or insurance on the value of the assets. If the toxic assets are now at 40% of value in the banks' books, the fund could guarantee that if values dropped below 30%, the losses will be borne by the fund. That way, it will put a bottom number to the amount that the banks will have to write down. That will be a big comfort as investors do not know how low these assets could go to. This way, they know the bottom, and the fund does not end up buying the toxic assets. If that eventuate, its good news for the banks.

Still, BoA is most in danger. Watch closely if any of the top management of BoA are leaving the company - if they are then its nationalisation, baby.


p/s photos: Meisa Kuroki


Could The USA Fall Into The Japan 18 Year Stagflation Trap?



There are now increasing opinions that the US may go the way of Japan - in having a prolonged stagflation. To refresh our memory, Japan's real estate and stock market bubble collapsed quite spectacularly sometime around 1990. The first couple of years saw a lot of wealth being erased from the real estate and stock portfolio. The following 16 odd years, even till today, basically saw Japan registering a period of stagflation or what some may refer to as the L-shaped recovery - i.e. you don't really recover. Japan made many policy mistakes (that the US should and could avoid):
a) it cut policy rates two years after the bust of its asset bubble while the US eased monetary policy aggressively after August 2007
b) it went into quantitative easing reversed ZIRP (zero interest rate policy) too slowly
c) it waited two years after the bursting of its bubbles to do a fiscal stimulus (and reversed it too early with a consumption tax) while the US did one – albeit a failed one – last year and is doing another large one now
d) it created a convoy system of zombie banks and corporate that were restructured too late while the US may become more aggressive in cleaning up the financial system
e) it had structural rigidities – like lifetime employment – that slowed down the adjustment while the US has a more flexible labor markets

If we were to look at the missteps by Japan, we might easily conclude that the US reacted much faster, swifter and the structural and employment adjustments were rapid as well. However, we must also acknowledge that Japan's bubble was in stocks and real estate - as bad as that sound, there were very little leverage or derivatives enlarging the bubble. The current credit implosion is largely driven by a leveraged credit, based on insufficient capital, propeled by new fangled derivatives. Thus in that light, the situation faced by the US was a lot worse than Japan.

Japan was in much better macro and financial shape than the US before and during its stagnation: high household and national savings and low leverage of the household sector, net foreign asset position that allowed it to finance its large fiscal deficit during the stagnation via domestic savings. The US instead has had near zero household savings and massive leverage for years, large current account deficits and is the largest net foreign debtor in the world. Thus any further fiscal stimulus by the US basically is further deficits on an already damaging deficit problem. The problems are in the US are magnified by the high debt levels on the personal level as well, and would eat immediately into consumption patterns. Whereas in Japan they still had truckloads of savings.

Fiscal policy has its limits when you are already the biggest net debtor and net borrower in the world and where you need to borrow this year $2 trillion net ($2.5 trillion gross) to finance your fiscal deficit ... and your currency is still backed by nothing. The US is taking an approach to bank recap and clean-up that looks more like Japan than the successful Swedish outright takeover/nationalization process. While the bad bank idea might work, it will require the US taxpayers to pony up another $2-$3 trillion to fund that bad bank. How many trillions of USD can you print before China and Russia turn around and say "wtf...".

The US and global economy are truly risking a near-depression if the policy reaction is not bold, aggressive, sustainable and credible. For almost every action that the Treasury or the government has proposed, there will be tons of criticisms, and that's beauty and beastly side of a true democracy. This credit crisis is not quite like any we have seen before as it involved an enormous amount of leverage, hence we have no textbook solutions to guide us. Hence, we can be assured that every single policy action, be it the TARP, the reworked and reworked stimulus plan, the bailouts, and now the bad bank idea ... will have a lot of detractors... and probably not many cheering the measures even if they agree (as no one is really sure they will work well).

We also have to remember that there are mainly two main schools of economic thought - though you could probably have tens of shools of economic thought on this - either you are a Keynesian or you are Gasparino (libertarian market purist). The latter being that mainly you think the markets should be allowed to correct itself, and bad companies should be allowed to fail, and shareholders should not be saved... or something to that effect. There are still many more who have opinions along those lines of thought which differ here and there, so you can understand why everyone is an asshole and an expert at the same time.

Back to the Japan trap, its government spending soared (after a couple of years following the correction) as a massive public works program covered the country with cement. Yet Japan also prevented the bust from performing its role of creative destruction. Businesses were reluctant to shed workers and renege on their lifetime employment guarantees. Japanese authorities encouraged banks to supply new credit to weak companies. This served to worsen the bad-debt problems within the banking system, which came to a head in the 1997 financial crisis. Academic research suggests that the increasing dominance of certain industries by so-called "zombie" firms tended to depress job creation and lower productivity. Product prices in zombie industries were low because of excess competition. Low prices and high wages reduced profits and discouraged new investment.

I was working for Nomura, the biggest Japanese securities firm then from 1988-1991, and I can say that Japan did one thing right: government spending increase. They did many things wrong which was what dragged the recession into a stagflation period for over ten years: they did not force bad banks to fail; the worst was allowing banks to not act on bad debts thus keeping technically insolvent businesses alive for years; the life-time employment culture caused many companies not to restructure; not allowing the banks to seek foreign investment to replenish their capital; not allowing foreign ownership of banks and most other companies which would have restructured many of them and given them much needed capital.

Hence to use the Japan experience to somehow link it to the futility of what the US government agencies are doing is flawed, very flawed. The bubble was deflated in stocks and property, stocks crashed because its a relatively open market with foreign participation, property died slowly as there were too many regulations preventing foreign ownership. I basically think that the US moved fast and aggressively, and industries are being restructured quickly, ... I don't like the bad bank idea but it will work best if you don't take the nationalisation route. The US will throw everything at the problems at hand. Its not much point to harp on how much money they will be flooding the system to do that. Yes, the USD is doomed for a long long depreciation. Its the lesser of two evils, throw more money at the problems... as not doing anything will be anarchy.

So, I do think that while the problems are huge, the US will be able to recover much faster and will not fall into the stagflation trap of Japan.

p/s photos: Megan Lai

Markets Can See Some Catalysts


US lawmakers are likely to hand Barack Obama the first major win of his week-old presidency on Wednesday, overriding chiefly Republican objections to pass an US$825-billion economic stimulus plan. The US House of Representatives was expected to approve the package, a centerpiece of Mr Obama's efforts to resurrect lost US jobs and kickstart stalled US growth, in the late afternoon or early evening largely along party lines. Key US Senate committees have begun shaping their chamber's version of the bill, as Democrats and the White House say they hope to speed the final measure through the US Congress and to the White House by mid-February.

The House vote was to come one day after the Democratic president made his first work visit to the capitol, wooing defiant Republicans with closed-door assurances that he hears their complaints and shares some of their worries. 'Nobody is more worried about the deficit and the debt than me. I will be judged by the legacy I have left behind,' Obama told House Republicans. The appeal came hours after Republican leaders, looking for more tax cuts and less spending, directed their troops to oppose the Democratic bill, which provides about US$550 billion in spending and US$275 billion in tax cuts.

Publicly, Mr Obama said he recognised 'legitimate' Republican gripes with his approach but argued waves of jobs losses and punishing economic news dictated urgent action and not political gamesmanship. 'I don't expect one hundred per cent agreement from my Republican colleagues,' Mr Obama said as fevered political maneuvering on Capitol Hill contrasted with the euphoria of his inauguration there a week before. 'But I do hope that we can all put politics aside and do the American people's business,' the president said in a time-honored appeal for Washington to overcome its bitter partisan divisions. Mr Obama may need Republican support for political cover if the stimulus plan, now widely popular with the US public, fails to achieve its sought-for effects.

The president wants thumping congressional majorities for the stimulus, the first big test of his presidency, to give him momentum for other priorities and to make good on his vow to be a bipartisan leader. Republicans lack the votes to defeat the stimulus bill on their own, but could slow its progress, especially in the Senate. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that $169 billion of the $825 billion in stimulus will hit the economy before the end of September and that the bulk of it will show up in 2010 and 2011. - AFP
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WSJ: A measure to allow judges to reduce the principal amounts of mortgages for troubled borrowers in bankruptcy cleared a key hurdle Tuesday when it was approved by a U.S. House panel. The legislation, which is progressing quickly in Congress, would amount to the most aggressive step yet by the federal government to help strapped borrowers avoid foreclosure. Proponents contend it will act like a stick, spurring mortgage servicers to complete more loan modifications. Meanwhile, the banking industry warns that it will raise mortgage costs for all borrowers.

The measure was approved on a 21-15 vote after its House sponsor, Judiciary Chairman John Conyers, D-Mich., agreed to changes that would narrow its scope. "While bankruptcy reform may not provide all of the answers to this crisis, surely it provides a common sense and practical approach to helping stop the spiral of home foreclosures," Conyers said in remarks before his panel.

Under the legislation, borrowers would be eligible to have a bankruptcy judge reduce the principal balance on their home loan - a move known as a "cram down." Current law allows cram downs for mortgages on vacation properties, but not for those on primary residences.

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CNBC: A Senate committee approved $342 billion in tax cuts on Tuesday as part of a larger plan to stimulate the economy. The Senate Finance Committee voted 14 to 9 to approve the legislation after amending the original proposal to make sure middle-class taxpayers aren't hit by the alternative minimum tax this year. All Republicans on the committee opposed the package except for Sen. Olympia Snowe, R-Me. The bill includes a $500 individual tax credit, tax breaks for businesses to hire workers and buy equipment, and tax incentives for energy efficiency.
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In Tokyo, the Nikkei Stock Average climbed 4.9% to 8061.07 Tuesday, also getting a boost from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which said it is considering a plan to provide public funds to companies beyond banks that have been hardest hit by the financial crisis. The fact that governments are beginning to look beyond the banking sector to revive the economy is a major step to begin to understand the gravity of the issues.
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The biggest catalyst has to be the report that the government is creating a plan to buy up toxic assets from firms in an effort to stabilize the shaky banking system. What that means is that there will probably be a person in charge mediating on the price to buy off the toxic assets from the banks. Right now, no private funds are willing to buy as there is no certainty on the price. This is the 'bad bank" plan, the bad bank will end up with the toxic assets. In reality we are going via the RTC method whereby we are consolidating the toxic assets, we are just ONE step shy of nationalising some of the banks - which may not be a bad thing. In fact, if Geithner takes the nationalisation path, I am certain the markets would rise further.

p/s photos: Sara Malakul Lane